Shaftesbury and the Stoic Roots of Modern Aesthetics by Norton, Brian Michael
Special Issue – The Birth of the Discipline







Abstract: Rather than reading Shaftesbury in anticipation of later forms of dis-
interestedness, this essay seeks to unpack the larger significance of his aesthetics
by tracing his ideas back to their ancient sources. This essay looks to the venerable
tradition of world contemplation. It argues that Shaftesbury advances a specifically
Stoic model of world contemplation in The Moralists. The text’s principal concern
is not with this or that beautiful object but with the whole of which it and the
viewer are indivisibly a part; its aim is not so much to account for how we perceive
beauty as to foster a characteristically Stoic orientation toward the world, one in
which we overcome our egocentric view of things and align ourselves with the nat-
ural workings of the world or universe in its entirety. Far from being ‘autonomous’
from the rest of life, the Stoic world contemplation Shaftesbury advocates entails a
robust affirmation of existence, clear-eyed gratitude for being part of the universe,
whatever the challenges and however fleeting our time in it may be.
Shaftesbury holds an uneasy place in our accounts of the origins of mod-
ern aesthetics. He is considered to be a pioneer of modern aesthetic theory,
a progenitor of what Paul Guyer and Timothy Costelloe call ‘philosophical
aesthetics’, but at the same time he is seen as not quite modern enough.1
Jerome Stolnitz, for example, famously credited Shaftesbury with helping to
‘establish the autonomy of the aesthetic’, while conceding that his ‘Idealist’
metaphysics prevented him from fully appreciating or embracing his own dis-
covery.2 In Peter Kivy’s estimation, he is both the ‘real founder’ of British
aesthetics and a ‘Neoplatonist, a philosophical reactionary’.3 More recently,
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and equably, Costelloe finds in the author’s writings ‘original contributions’
to and ‘founding themes’ of the tradition that followed, even as his thought
increasingly came to be seen as an ‘oddity, a nod back’ to antiquity.4
The trick to making this conspicuously classical thinker one of us is to
focus as much as possible on these themes and contributions, picking out
those passages that initiate, advance or in some way anticipate later aesthetic
concepts. Shaftesbury’s key contribution here has long been understood to
center on the idea of disinterestedness, a distinguishing feature of modern
aesthetic theory and for some a sine qua non of aesthetics itself.5 According
to Stolnitz’s well-known account, which identifies Shaftesbury as the first
to bring attention to the concept, aesthetic disinterestedness represents not
just a ‘falling away of self-concern’, but a special mode of perception that
‘does not relate the object to any purposes that outrun the act of perception
itself’.6 An end in itself in this strong sense, disinterestedness is thought to
isolate aesthetic value from all other values and concerns, whether practical,
cognitive, moral, cosmological or existential.7
I want to suggest that Shaftesbury’s distinction to being among the first
of the moderns, however asterisked, has come at the expense of a fuller un-
derstanding of his philosophical project and the classical tradition on which
it draws. Here I align myself with recent critics of the ‘teleological nar-
rative’ that locates the beginnings of ‘modern aesthetic autonomy’ in early
eighteenth-century Britain and reads its theorists through the lens of the later
tradition.8
The teleological account is especially harmful to a holistic, ethically-
oriented thinker like Shaftesbury. What we see as the ‘aesthetic’ parts of The
Moralists, Shaftesbury’s landmark work of aesthetic theory, are woven into
larger discussions of nature, divinity, human flourishing, the problem of evil,
and the moral composition of the universe. From start to finish the dialogue
pursues the broad, inclusive question of ‘what real Good is’, as Philocles puts
it, which Shaftesbury, like his classical forebears, understood to be a practical
rather than a theoretical problem. His aim, Michael Gill observes, ‘was to
urge his readers to live in a certain way, not to convince scholars to believe
one thing or another on any speculative matter’.9 Deploring what he saw as
the narrowing of modern thought, Shaftesbury championed philosophy as it
was classically practiced, above all, by figures like Socrates, Epictetus and
Marcus Aurelius, hoping to restore it to its ‘antient Title, of Guide of life’.10
There is a particular irony, then, in trying to pick out from his writings a set
of technical formulations regarding disinterested pleasure and autotelic per-
ception. It is to read him not just anachronistically and in piecemeal fashion
but to judge him by the very standards he rejected.
Rather than reading Shaftesbury in anticipation of later forms of disinter-
estedness, this essay seeks to unpack the larger significance of his aesthetics
by tracing his ideas back to their ancient sources. Scholars generally compre-
hend ‘ “aesthetics” before aesthetics’, to use Costelloe’s phrase, to originate
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in classical investigations of beauty and theoretically-minded discussions of
the arts.11 But as we work to dislodge the teleological narrative, it is also
important to expand our sense of the relevant prehistory of the discipline,
looking beyond those concepts and practices that are most readily assimi-
lated to post-Kantian philosophical aesthetics. Indeed, we need to bracket
our assumptions about what aesthetics is and follow the evidence where it
leads, even into territory that may appear to us to be ‘non-aesthetic’.12 In
Shaftesbury’s case – and perhaps not only in Shaftesbury’s case – this means
attending to the venerable tradition of world contemplation, which begins
with ancient philosophy’s belief, as described by Pierre Hadot, that ‘what
gives meaning and value to human life is the contemplation of nature’.13
In a wide range of classical texts, we find thinkers turning to the environing
world in awe and reverence, with many claiming that this is in fact what we
were born to do. Plutarch, for example, posits that ‘the universe is a most
holy temple and most worthy of a god; into it man is introduced through
birth as a spectator’.14 And Longinus, whose influence on eighteenth-century
aesthetics is well known, writes that nature ‘brought us into this life and
into the whole universe as into a great celebration, to be spectators of her
whole performance’.15 This long and eclectic tradition, notably reinvigorated
in seventeenth-century Britain, comprises a rich body of reflections on the
value and significance of our contemplative experience of the world.16
I.
No ancient school placed greater importance on world contemplation than
the Stoics, and, as I will demonstrate in what follows, it is a specifically Stoic
form of world contemplation that Shaftesbury puts forward in The Moralists.
The text’s principal concern is not with this or that beautiful object but with
the whole of which it and the viewer are indivisibly a part; its aim is not so
much to account for how we perceive beauty as to foster a characteristically
Stoic orientation toward the world, one in which we overcome our egocentric
view of things and align ourselves with the natural workings of the world or
universe in its entirety. Needless to say, this attitude is not one of indifference
or cool detachment. The Stoic world contemplation Shaftesbury advocates –
far from being ‘autonomous’ from the rest of life – entails a robust affirmation
of existence, clear-eyed gratitude for being part of the universe, whatever the
challenges and however fleeting our time in it may be.
Shaftesbury’s attachment to Stoic philosophy is well known. A footnote
to the biographical entry on the third Earl in Thomas Birch’s General Dic-
tionary, Historical and Critical (1734-41), likely written by Shaftesbury’s
nephew James Harris, himself an accomplished classicist, tells us that among
the texts ‘he most admired, and carried always with him, were the moral
works of Xenophon, Horace, the Commentaries and Enchiridion of Epictetus
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as published by Arrian, and Marcus Antonius’.17 Shaftesbury’s allegiances
are especially evident in the Askêmata, the private notebooks he kept pri-
marily between 1698 and 1704 during his two sojourns in Holland, which
Benjamin Rand first published in 1900 under the title Philosophical Regimen.
Written as reminders of key principles and exhortations to live up to those
principles, much like Marcus Aurelius’ own Meditations, the Askêmata teems
with Stoic citations, above all to Marcus and to Epictetus, whom Shaftesbury
refers to as a ‘divine man’.18 Rand characterised the notebooks as perhaps
the clearest ‘expression of stoicism since the days of Epictetus and Marcus
Aurelius’, a judgment confirmed more recently by Shaftesbury’s biographer,
Robert Voitle, who finds in them ‘the finest examples of purely Stoic thought
since Marcus Aurelius wrote down his own meditations’.19 While they may
be less explicit than in the Askêmata, Stoic themes and ideas also infuse the
Characteristicks, which takes the image for its frontispiece – a ray of sunlight
falling upon a bowl of water in the foreground, a serene and waveless bay in
the background – from metaphors found in the pages of Shaftesbury’s two
favourite Stoics.20
Scholars have examined these resonances in illuminating detail, shedding
light on a host of key Shaftesburian ideas, from the author’s framing of phi-
losophy itself as a practical art of living to his concepts of cosmic order,
natural sociability, moral realism, virtue, and self-fashioning.21 For the most
part, however, this work has not extended to Shaftesbury’s role as a founder of
modern aesthetics – this despite the fact that his Stoicism is also on abundant
display in The Moralists, his preeminently aesthetic text. Among its many
and unmistakable references to Stoic ideas: the concepts of natural sociability
(2.179), world citizenship (2.105) and the ‘universal Conflagration’ (2.213);
a belief in the decisiveness of ‘Opinion’ (2.233); the theory of an animating
force in nature, a mixture of breath and fire that the Greeks called pneuma
and Shaftsbury describes as a ‘soft, invisible, and vital Flame’ (2.212); the
idea that the universe is ‘One Intire Thing’ (2.195) held together by a ‘Sym-
pathy of Parts’ (2.196), that it is divinely ordered and indeed inspirited by
the divine (2.207); the proposition that the best life a human can live is one in
accordance with nature (2.242), which is to say, one in which the individual
wills what the universe itself wills (2.201).
This relative lacuna in the scholarship is perhaps due to the fact that while
Shaftesbury may be regarded a Stoic in ethics, he is generally understood to
be a Platonist (or Neoplatonist) in aesthetics, as evidenced by commenta-
tors from Stolnitz to Kivy, Townsend, Costelloe and Guyer.22 In proposing
a Stoic reading of The Moralists, I do not mean to deny the presence of Pla-
tonist ideas in the text or to somehow pit Stoicism against Platonism. But
I do maintain that these Platonist elements operate within a larger Stoic
framework.23 Shaftesbury’s concern is not with the transcendent One but
with the Stoic Whole, and the contemplation he espouses doesn’t lead us to
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a higher world of Forms but attunes us to the ‘Nature’ of our present world,
which for the Stoics is the only world there is.24 Theocles offers a convenient
summation toward the end of the dialogue:
‘Can you not call to mind what we resolv’d concerning Nature?
Can any thing be more desirable than to follow her? Or is it not
by this Freedom from our Passions and low Interests, that we are
reconcil’d to the goodly Order of the Universe; that we harmonize
with Nature; and live in Friendship both with God and Man?’
(2.242).
To understand this aspect of Shaftesbury’s thought, we need to look back to
the Stoic tradition of world contemplation on which it draws.
II.
Like other ancient writers and thinkers, the Stoics gazed upon the world in
reverential appreciation. They too claimed we were born for such contem-
plation, which they understood in terms of a telos or calling, something we
ought to do. In a well-known passage of On the Nature of the Gods, Cicero
has Balbus, his spokesperson for Stoicism, declare that humans ‘came into
existence for the purpose of contemplating and imitating the world’.25 Epicte-
tus proposes that ‘god has introduced man into the world as a spectator of
himself and of his works’.26 And Seneca maintains that nature has ‘brought
us into being to view the mighty spectacle’.27 We can understand this, in
part, as a debt we owe nature or nature’s creator. ‘What service to God is
there in this contemplation?’ Seneca asks. His answer: ‘That the greatness
of his work be not without witness’.28
Seneca’s well-known contention that accepting ‘a favour gladly is to have
repaid it’ is directly relevant here: ‘are you denying that the vast expanse
of earth wide open before you is a favour?’29 Stoics begin to discharge this
debt through their joyful appreciation of the world, which is itself a form of
tribute and thanksgiving. In his Hymn to Zeus, for example, Cleanthes seeks
to ‘repay’ the creator by ‘for ever singing of [his] works, as it befits mortals to
do’.30 While the Stoic of popular imagination may be cold and affectless, flesh-
and-blood Stoics rhapsodised the cosmos, extolling the whole of existence.
We were not brought here to censure the world, Epictetus asserts, but, like a
‘grateful’ guest at a festival, ‘to applaud it, and view it with reverence, and
sing its praises’.31 To do anything less would be a sign of ingratitude.
Beyond demonstrating gratitude and appreciation, world contemplation
was also considered integral to the core Stoic project of following nature.
As a component of Stoic physics, one of the three interrelated branches of
Stoic philosophy, it was a principal means by which Stoics sought to align
themselves with the natural workings of the universe. ‘The aim of this type
of exercise’, John Sellars explains, ‘is to train one’s desires and aversions, to
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accustom oneself to desire whatever happens, to bring one’s will into harmony
with the will of the cosmos’.32 World contemplation, then, is not only natural
for us in the sense that it is itself a vital human end – ‘part of what we are
for ’, as Brad Inwood puts it – but because it enables us to pursue this larger
project.33
To return to Epictetus’ earlier claim: ‘god has introduced man into the
world as a spectator of himself and of his works; and not only as a spectator,
but an interpreter of them. It is therefore shameful that man should begin
and end where irrational creatures do. He ought rather to begin there, but
to end where nature itself has fixed our end; and that is in contemplation
and understanding and a way of life in harmony with nature’.34 Rather than
being an end in itself, as it is for Aristotle and Stolnitz, contemplation is also
a means toward this further end: it is how a Stoic follows nature. Through
‘contemplating’ the world we deepen our ‘understanding’ of its inner workings,
which, in turn, helps us lead lives that are ‘in harmony with nature’. What
Epictetus describes here are not so much discreet steps as an ongoing process
of attuning oneself to the whole of nature, internalising and patterning oneself
on its order. To repeat Cicero’s otherwise puzzling phrase, we ‘came into
existence for the purpose of contemplating and imitating the world’.
The ultimate value of world contemplation is that it enables us to over-
come our limited view of things and align ourselves with the cosmos as a
whole. According to Hadot, this ‘consists in re-placing oneself within the
context of the cosmic All, and in becoming aware of human existence as be-
ing a part, one that must conform to the will of the Whole’.35 Both he and
Inwood describe this process as simultaneously humbling and ennobling. It
is humbling in so far as we recognise ourselves to be vanishingly small beings
in the vast expanse of time and space; and it is ennobling in so far as we feel
a sense of kinship with this larger system, a connection to it, which, for the
sage, takes the form of a powerful identification. Consider this passage from
Marcus Aurelius:
‘But it is now high time that you realized what kind of a universe
this is of which you form a part, and from what governor of that
universe you exist as an emanation; and that your time here is
strictly limited, and, unless you make use of it to clear the fog
from your mind, the moment will be gone, as you are gone, and
never be yours again’.36
The world Marcus contemplates is one of Heraclitan flux and change, in which
all things are continuously coming into and passing out of being, including
Marcus himself. Loss and pain are inescapable. Yet he also recognises himself
to be ‘part’ of the universe, an ‘emanation’ of the reason that pervades and
governs it. The central challenge of Stoicism is to affirm this universe and
everything that happens, not because of how things are for you (a part), but
because the universe itself (the whole) couldn’t be better than it is. Each
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time we contemplate the world we rehearse and recommit ourselves to this
task. In Hadot’s terms, we locate ourselves within the ‘cosmic All’ and align
our wills with the ‘will of the Whole.’ Marcus neatly captures this attitude in
what Hadot calls his ‘prayer to the World’: ‘All that is in accord with you is
in accord with me, O World!’37 For the Stoics, this is what it means to follow
nature.
III.
Shaftesbury elaborates the same model of world contemplation in The Moral-
ists. To see how it works in detail let us turn to the extended account we find
in part three when Philocles joins his friend Theocles, as appointed, for his
morning walk outside his country home. The two arrive at ‘the most beauti-
ful part’ of a nearby hill, just at dawn, and, with the countryside spread out
before them, Theocles begins his ‘Meditation’ (2.193). Given the dialogue’s
status as a founding text of modern aesthetics, we might expect him here to
frame the scene, picking out a particularly beautiful object or vista to analyse
or describe; or, alternatively, we might expect him to speculate about how or
why it is that gazing upon certain objects produces in us a certain kind of
pleasure. He does neither. Rather than instructing Philocles on the principles
of composition or the mechanics of taste, Theocles launches into an impas-
sioned apostrophe to ‘Nature’s Order’ – a ‘celestial Hymn’ in the manner of
Cleanthes – in which he praises the surrounding countryside for providing
‘a happy Leisure and Retreat for Man; who, made for Contemplation, and
to search his own and other Natures, may here best meditate the Cause of
Things’ (2.193).38 Though the passage draws on a longstanding opposition
between city and country, it ultimately doesn’t value one portion of the world
over another. The advantage of their present location is not that it is more
beautiful (or innocent) than the town but that it contains fewer things to dis-
tract them from the ‘Contemplation’ humans were made for. And the focus
of this contemplation, the text makes clear, is not individual works of nature
but the natural world or universe in its entirety.39
For Shaftesbury, of course, it is the ‘Whole’ that matters and ‘the part
is of value only to the extent that it participates in it’.40 But we must dis-
tinguish between how the part/whole relationship functions with respect to
art objects and how it functions with respect to the world. Because artists
cannot ‘bring All Nature’ into a work but ‘a Part only’, Shaftesbury writes
in Soliloquy, they should endeavour to make that part ‘a Whole’ in itself,
‘compleat, independent, and withal as great and comprehensive’ as possible
(1.89). The idea that a successful work of art is a consonant, organic, au-
tonomous whole would become a key tenet of modern aesthetics. But the
part/whole relationship works differently in the case of the world or universe
in its entirety, which can never be an object of direct perception.
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This is why Theocles doesn’t try to frame or compose the scene before
him, analysing it as if it were an artwork: the whole he’s searching for can’t
be grasped in a perceptual Gestalt. Nevertheless, through gazing upon part
of the world Theocles does indeed contemplate the world as a whole. As
Hadot observes, this kind of contemplation was quite prevalent in classical
philosophy. He describes it like this: ‘in considering a partial aspect of the
world, contemplation discovers the totality of the world, going beyond the
landscape glimpsed at a given moment, and transcending it on the way to a
representation of totality which surpasses every visible object’.41 Never given
in perception, the whole is intuited in contemplation. Again and again in
The Moralists, we find this synecdochal movement from part to whole, this
reaching out for the larger system. In the present case, Theocles’ meditation
moves from the nature before him to ‘Nature’ in general, from this corner of
the world to the ‘World’ as a whole, his apostrophes growing more general as
he salutes ‘Ye Fields and Woods’ in the first paragraph, ‘O glorious Nature!’
in the second, and ‘O Sovereign MIND!’ in the fourth. To borrow Philocles’s
language from earlier in the dialogue, he is not satisfied with the ‘Beauty of a
Part’ but seeks the ‘just and wise Administration’ of ‘the Whole’ (2.120-121).
As with the Stoics, the universe Theocles contemplates is more than the
sum of its physical parts – it includes the complex interconnectedness of those
parts, the principle by which it is itself an entity as opposed to being merely
an aggregate of separate entities, and the order or intelligence characterising
its collective operations. When Theocles pauses his ‘divine Song’ to check in
with the spellbound Philocles, he is keen to establish that the ‘Universe’ is
‘One Intire Thing’, that ‘All hangs together, as of a Piece’ (2.195). If this is
the case, he reasons, then there is something ‘which makes it One’ (2.195),
a ‘uniting Principle’ (2.200) constituting it as one universe the way a single
tree is one tree, or, more specifically, a ‘Self-principle’ (2.204) analogous to
the way an individual person is one self. This is a favourite theme of Marcus
Aurelius. ‘Constantly think of the universe as a single living being,’ he writes,
‘comprised of a single substance and a single soul.’42 And again: ‘For there
is one universe made up of all that is, and one god who pervades all things,
and one substance and one law, and one reason common to all intelligent
creatures. . . ’.43
Shaftesbury refers to this principle by a variety of names, each with its
own specific shade of meaning, including ‘Nature’s Order’, the ‘Order of the
UNIVERSE’, the ‘Sovereign MIND’, the ‘Guardian-DEITY and Inspirer ’, the
‘mighty GENIUS’, and the ‘Original SOUL’. Guyer notes that it is ultimately
this ‘divine mind’, and not physical objects, we ‘know and admire in all
perception of beauty, that with which our own mind harmonizes’.44 This
is certainly Shaftesbury’s position. But I’d like to suggest that it is not
as otherworldly (or Neoplatonist) as it sounds. While Shaftesbury clearly
privileges mind over physical things, as do the Stoics, it must be stressed
that he, again like the Stoics, doesn’t place mind above or beyond or outside
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our world. It inheres in our world: ‘diffusive, vital in all, inspiriting the
Whole’ (2.207), it gives our world its specific character, making it what it is.
Shaftesbury’s terms for this principle are lofty – and, to his contemporaries,
provocatively deist in their vagueness – but what they seek to describe are the
ordinary workings of our universe, the common course of things, what it is
tempting to think of simply as reality. Rather than maligning existence for not
measuring up to something higher (as an ‘Idealist’ might), Shaftesbury makes
the actual universe his moral touchstone. Just as ‘every particular Nature’ is
‘constantly and unerringly true to it-self, and certain to produce only what is
good for it-self’, Theocles posits, the same can be said of ‘the general-one, The
NATURE of the Whole’, which, in pursuing its ‘own advantage and good’,
works for the ‘Good of All in general’. Here we come to the crux of Stoic
ethics: ‘And what is for the good of all in general, is Just and Good’ (2.202).
There is no higher moral authority, nothing to transcend to.45 As Cicero puts
it, nothing is better than the world.46
IV.
But to fully grasp this justice and goodness, Shaftesbury suggests, we must
overcome our own egocentrism and the spiritual myopia it engenders. In
Hadot’s terms, we must recognise that we ourselves are merely parts of the
larger whole. The primacy of the whole over the parts, in other words, per-
tains even to the ‘part’ doing the contemplating. This is one of the principal
lessons of The Moralists. ‘What is it then shou’d so disturb our Views of
Nature’, Theocles asks, ‘as to destroy that Unity of Design and Order of a
Mind, which otherwise wou’d be so apparent?’ His answer: our own self-
centeredness, as individuals and as a species. ‘All is delightful, amiable,
rejoicing, except with relation to Man only’, he exclaims, channeling the self-
centered perspective.
‘Here the Calamity and Ill arises; and hence the Ruin of this
goodly Frame. All perishes on this account; and the whole Order
of the Universe . . . is here o’erthrown, and lost by this one View; in
which we refer all things to our-selves: submitting the Interest of
the Whole to the Good and Interest of so small a Part’ (2.164).47
Blinkered by ego- and anthropocentrism, we get things exactly wrong, sub-
jecting the ‘Whole’ to the ‘Part’ instead of the other way around. We put
ourselves before the world and, as a result, we condemn what we should
praise. Marcus likens such estrangement to becoming an ‘abscess’ on the
body of the universe (14, 29). Shaftesbury depicts it as the actual toppling
of the cosmic ‘Order’, the ‘Ruin of this goodly Frame’. It is only by letting
go of our egocentric view of things, he insists, that we can truly appreciate
the unity and harmony of the whole. In doing so, we recognise that nature is
‘as wise and provident’ in its most terrible ‘Productions’ as in its ‘goodliest
171
Shaftesbury and the Stoic Roots of Modern Aesthetics
Works’, indeed, that it is precisely upon such ‘Contrarietys’ that the ‘uni-
versal Concord is establish’d’ (2.121). With this concordia discors in mind,
even things that appear ‘contrary to human Nature’ raise our ‘Admiration’ of
‘Divine Wisdom’: ‘Disorder becomes regular; Corruption wholesom; and Poi-
sons . . . prove healing and beneficial’ (2.217). From this cosmic perspective,
all ‘Ills’ are imaginary, the mistaken judgments of partial minds.48
The ultimate aim of Shaftesburian world contemplation, like the Stoic
version on which it draws, is to shake off one’s limited view of things and
attune oneself to the natural order of the universe. As we begin to understand
ourselves as parts of the larger whole, we gain a new perspective on our lives
and experience a softening of the boundary between self and world. Theocles
describes this in the same humbling/ennobling terms as Hadot and Inwood.
After having ‘sally’d forth into the wide Expanse’ and then returned ‘within
my-self ’, he reports, he is ‘struck with the Sense of this so narrow Being,
and of the Fulness of that Immense-one’; at the same time, he is buoyed by
a feeling of identification with the mind that has formed him and which it
is ‘the peculiar Dignity’ of his ‘Nature’ to ‘know and contemplate’ (2:194).
Recognising that ‘this Self of mine’ was ‘drawn out, and copy’d’ from ‘the
Great-one of the World’, he continues, ‘I endeavour to be really one with it,
and conformable to it, as far as I am able’ (2.201). In affective terms, we can
understand this as the oceanic feeling of being connected to something larger
than oneself, what Hadot describes as an ‘almost mystical feeling of belonging
to the cosmic Whole’.49 In traditional aesthetic terms, we know it as a version
of the sublime. It is important to recognise, however, that what Shaftesbury
is describing is not a passive, end-in-itself experience. Theocles endeavours
to be one with the world, to be ‘conformable to it’, to accommodate himself
to and model himself on the order he contemplates.50
In other words, he is cultivating the attitude of Marcus’ ‘prayer to the
World’: ‘All that is in accord with you is in accord with me, O World!’ This
is the final telos of Stoic world contemplation and the cornerstone of Stoic
imperturbability: the sage wills the world to be what it is and for its events
to unfold as they inexorably must. As Epictetus puts it, ‘Do not ask things to
happen as you wish, but wish them to happen as they do happen, and your
life will go smoothly’.51 And here is Marcus’ celebrated formulation: ‘the
universe loves to create whatever is to be; so I will say to the universe, “Your
love is my love too” ’.52 Shaftesbury returns to this idea repeatedly in his
work. In the Askêmata, he writes that true wisdom requires us to learn ‘how
to submit all of [our] affections to the rule and government of the whole’ and
‘how to accompany with [our] whole mind that supreme and perfect mind and
reason of the universe’.53 He declares in Soliloquy that the ‘sublimest’ parts
of philosophy concern the ‘Laws of Nature’, the ‘Order of the Universe’, and
the ‘Justice of accompanying this amiable Administration’ (1.195). And in
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Miscellaneous Reflections, he speaks of the ‘generous Surrender of [the] Mind
to whatever happens from that Supreme CAUSE, or ORDER of Things’
(3.137).
As I have been arguing, this is also the final end of Theocles’s world
contemplation. More than simply admiring the ‘just and wise Administration’
of ‘the Whole’, he seeks to accompany it, to use Shaftesbury’s term from
Soliloquy, or as Theocles himself explains, he ‘co-operates with it’, striving
‘to will according to the best of Wills’ (2.201). Like Marcus and Epictetus,
he aligns himself with the cosmic order, acceding to the natural course of
things. We should ‘be pleas’d and rejoice at what happens’, he tells Philocles,
‘knowing whence it comes, and to what Perfection it contributes’ (2.202). For
Theocles, as for his Stoic mentors, this is the path to a good life.54 The
‘particular MIND’, he maintains, ‘shou’d seek its Happiness in conformity
with the general-one, and endeavour to resemble it in its highest Simplicity
and Excellence’ (2.201). The world contemplation he advocates aims at and
facilitates these ends.
V.
This attitude, it should be clear by now, extends well beyond the ‘act of per-
ception itself’. Shaftesburian world contemplation concerns life as a whole,
our being in the world, how a person should live.55 The closing pages of the
text, which turn more directly to the topics of happiness and virtue, make this
explicit. But this has been Shaftesbury’s project all along. Through contem-
plating the universe, Theocles gears into its underlying order, ‘laying within
himself the lasting and sure Foundations of Order, Peace, and Concord’. He
thereby becomes the ‘Architect of his own Life and Fortune’ (2.238). For
Theocles, as for the Stoics, the best human life is a life of virtue, which is also
a life according to reason and a life according to nature. These are all ways
of saying the same thing: a life that is in tune with the fundamental workings
of the universe. As I begin to wrap up this essay, I’d like to look at how this
attitude structures or informs our sense of what life is, giving urgency and
poignancy to our fleeting time in the world.
Here, too, Shaftesbury finds inspiration in the Stoics. He shows himself
to be particularly indebted to this passage from Epictetus, which foregrounds
the existential stakes of world contemplation by combining the metaphor of
the world theater with another classical trope: life is a pageant or festival.
Given its impact on Shaftesbury, it is worth quoting at some length:
Was it not he who brought you here? Was it not he who showed
you the light? . . . And as what did he bring you here? Was it not
as a mortal? Was it not as one who would live, with a little portion
of flesh, upon this earth, and behold his governance and take part
with him, for a short time, in his pageant and his festival? Are you
not willing, then, for the time that is granted to you, to behold
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his pageant and his solemn assembly, and then, when he leads you
out, will you not pass on your way, after paying him obeisance and
offering him thanksgiving for what you have heard and what you
have seen? . . . But the festival is over. Leave it and depart like a
grateful and modest person; make room for others.
Now consider this passage from the Askêmata:
To what further time wouldst thou live? Hadst thou seen enough?
Is not once seeing enough? How often wouldst thou be spectator?
how long a guest? Where is the modesty of this? where the
respect, the observance, duty, gratitude towards the master of the
feast? Enough, then. Rise and give thanks. – Pass on, move.
You have seen. Let others see. At night always thus. I have been
admitted to the spectacle, I have seen, I have applauded. It is
enough.
Shaftesbury’s debts to Epictetus are clear. We find the same plaiting of the
‘spectator’ and ‘guest’ metaphors, the same feelings of reverence, celebration,
and gratitude, the same embrace of mortality, the same giving of thanks and
making room for others. Like Epictetus, he tells himself that what matters
is not the number of days he is granted but the quality of attention he brings
to the world. Shaftesbury encapsulates the entire project in a challenge – ‘Is
not once seeing enough?’ – a juxtaposing of the cosmic and the finite that
anticipates Rilke: ‘Once for each thing. Just once; no more. And we too, /
just once. And never again’.56
Shaftesbury returns to this idea in The Moralists. The passage occurs just
after Theocles has made his case for the fundamental unity and goodness of
the universe. It is a passing moment in the text, perhaps easy to overlook,
but it is among the most lyrical and evocative in all of the Characteristicks:
The temporary Beings quit their borrow’d Forms, and yield their
elementary Substances to New-Comers. Call’d, in their several
turns, to Life, they view the Light, and viewing pass; that others
too may be Spectators of the goodly Scene, and greater numbers
still enjoy the Privilege of Nature. (2.205)
We are called into the world to ‘view the Light’, to be ‘Spectators of the
goodly Scene’; we enjoy our turn and in a moment exit, allowing others to do
the same. To be alive is to be in and of the world, to be alive to the world.
And when our time is up, we are physically reabsorbed back into the universe,
resupplying it with the materials of life. ‘New Forms arise: and when the old
dissolve, the Matter whence they were compos’d is not left useless . . . ’ (2.205-
206).57 There is no clamoring here for transcendence or eternity. Instead, we
find a generous surrender of the mind to the natural workings of the universe,
even those aspects that seem most contrary to human nature. When the end
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comes, as Theocles had told Philocles earlier in the dialogue, the important
thing is not whether life be of ‘fewer or more Years’, but that you are ‘satisfy’d
with what you have liv’d’ and ‘rise a thankful Guest’ (2.142).
VI.
To read Shaftesbury in these terms is to broaden our conception of what
modern aesthetics is a modern version of. Its prehistory reaches back not
just to ancient discussions of beauty and the arts, but to the equally illus-
trious tradition of world contemplation. The Stoics, for whom the practice
was especially important, placed world contemplation at the center of living
a full and flourishing life. Not only is the practice profoundly satisfying in
itself, they maintained, but it enables us to gear into the natural order of
the cosmos, tuning ourselves to it, aligning our desires with its ineluctable
workings. Stoics understood this to be the best life a person can live, a life
in accord with nature. As I have sought to demonstrate, this is precisely the
project Shaftesbury lays out in The Moralists. My primary goal has been to
reframe the way we think about the origins of modern aesthetics by tracing
Shaftesbury’s ideas back to their hidden sources. But this reframing might
also invite us to reconsider his place in the tradition that comes after him.
Rather than viewing Shaftesbury as the unwitting founder of the disinter-
ested school of philosophical aesthetics, it might be more useful to see him
as a forerunner of its many and distinguished dissidents, those who refuse to
cloister the aesthetic from everything else that matters to us.58
bnorton@fullerton.edu
NOTES
1Guyer and Costelloe use the term, in
part, to signal their modern disciplinary
understanding of the subject. See Guyer




5See Stolnitz 1961a and 1961b. Guyer
and Costelloe consider disinterestedness to
be among Shaftesbury’s most significant
contributions to modern aesthetics, even
as Guyer holds that the concept itself is
not as significant as it is often taken to
be (Guyer 2018, 30; Costelloe 2013, 20).
For literary treatments of Shaftesbury’s
disinterestedness, see Paulson 1996, 23-47
and Valihora 2010, 90-107. For persuasive
critiques of Stolnitz, see Townsend 1982,
Rind 2002, Glauser 2002, and Axelsson
2019.
6Stolnitz 1961b, 107-108 and Stolnitz
1961a, 134.
7In Kant’s extraordinary claim, disin-
terestedness demands that we remain ‘in-
different’ to the very existence of the thing
contemplated (Kant 1987, 46).
8Axelsson, Flodin, and Pirholt 2021,
1. For other recent works that challenge
the still-dominant narrative, see Axelsson
2019 and Grote 2019.
9Gill 2018, 111-12.
10Shaftesbury 2001, Volume 1, 184.
Hereafter cited parenthetically by volume
and page number. As Klein notes, Shaftes-
bury opposed ‘the encroachments of sci-
ence and the reorientation of philosophy
around epistemology’ (Klein 1994, 29).
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For influential studies of the practical,
therapeutic orientation of classical philos-
ophy, see Nussbaum 1994 and Hadot 1995.
For Shaftsbury’s classical orientation, see
Klein 1994, Jaffro 1999, Amir 2015, and
Sellars 2016.
11Costelloe 2013, 3.
12I take this term from Axelsson, Flodin,
and Pirholt, who welcome the move in re-
cent scholarship toward a more ‘dialectical
understanding of the relationship between
autonomy and heteronomy’, one in which,
‘from our contemporary standpoint, non-
aesthetic concerns are continuously re-
garded as informing aesthetic experience,
and vice versa’ (Axelsson, Flodin, and
Pirholt 2021, 2).
13Hadot 2002, 210. Hadot’s influence on




16For more on the seventeenth-century
discourse of world contemplation and an
analysis of how it informed Addison’s aes-
thetic theory, see Norton 2020.
17Birch 1734-41, vol. 9, 186. The au-
thor bases this claim on the evidence of
Shaftesbury’s annotations in books found
in his library. For a more recent study of
the author’s extant books – one that con-
firms the General Dictionary’s assessment
– see Collis 2016.
18Shaftesbury 1900, 21.
19Rand 1900, xii, Voitle 1984, 135.
20For the standard account of Shaftes-
bury’s illustrations, see Paknadel 1974.
21This literature is vast. See for exam-
ple, Rand 1900, Tiffany 1923, Aldridge
1951, Voitle 1984, Klein 1994, Darwell
1995, Jaffro 1999, Carey 2006, Brooke
2012, Boyson 2013, Gatti 2014, Derhmann
2014, Collis 2016, Sellars 2016, and Axels-
son 2019.
22See Stolnitz 1961b, 112; Kivy 2003, 6;
Townsend 1982, 206-207; Costelloe 2013,
12; Guyer 2018, 34.
23While there is no scholarly consen-
sus on the relationship between Stoic and
Platonist ideas in Shaftesbury’s thought,
compelling arguments for the primacy of
Stoicism can be found in Tiffany 1923,
Aldridge 1951, Gatti 2014, and Derhmann
2014.
24Tatarkiewicz points out that the
Stoics ‘ascribed to the real world the
reason, perfection and beauty, which
Plato had perceived only in ideal Forms’
(Tatarkiewicz 1970, 186). Hadot puts it
this way: ‘Physis or nature, which, for the
Platonists and the Aristotelians, was only
a small part – and the lowest part at that
– of the whole of reality, becomes all of





29Seneca 1995, 237, 277.
30Cleanthes, ‘Hymn to Zeus.’ In Long
and Sedley 1987, 327.
31Epictetus 1995, 237, 238.
32Sellars 2003, 137.
33Inwood 2009, 214.
34Epictetus 1995, 17. See also Seneca:
‘So I live according to Nature if I devote
myself wholly to her, if I marvel at her and
worship her. Nature wished me to do both




37Quoted in Hadot 1998, 143.
38As Shaftesbury suggests in Inquiry,
this order cannot be ‘contemplated with-
out Extasy and Rapture’; like the Stoics,
he muses such ‘Passion’ may not only be
‘just’ but ‘absolutely due and requisite in
every rational Creature’ (2.43-44). For a
stylistic reading of Theocles’ rhapsody, see
Rogers 1972.
39Axelsson notes: ‘Rather than paving
the way for a modern aesthetic disinterest-
edness where the agent’s perception termi-
nates upon the aesthetic object, [Shaftes-
bury] is preoccupied with our natural
moral and emotional engagement and im-
mersion in the Whole (both in the form of
natural society and nature designed by the
Deity, and in the form of individual works







44Guyer 2018, 43. For a specifically
Stoic reading of Shaftesbury’s concept of
‘mind’, see Gatti 2014, 68.
45Gatti makes a parallel argument about
‘beauty’: ‘for the Neoplatonist true beauty
is not in the world, but elsewhere, in an
ideal realm, whereas for the Stoics it is al-
ready in the world, and as “real” beauty,
not merely a pale and defective reflection
of an intelligible archetype’ (Gatti 2014,
71).
46Cicero 1951, 141.
47The notion that the universe as a
whole is just and good may strike some
readers as glib and Pollyannaish. But
Shaftesbury is not denying that we will
experience loss and suffering and hard-
ship in life; we most certainly will. The
challenge of Stoicism, as noted above, is
to affirm the workings of the universe as
a whole independently of one’s personal
situation or fate. For a similar take on
Shaftesbury’s ‘optimism’, see Voitle 148.
Cf. Aldridge who suggests a benevolent
universe would preclude the need for Stoic
austerity (Aldridge 1951, 342).
48For an illuminating treatment of this
issue, see Müller 2010.
49Hadot 1998, 230.
50‘The prevailing symbolism of Shaftes-
bury’, Tiffany explains, ‘is that of the Stoic
whole, and of harmony, in the sense of co-
operation of the individual with the whole.
A man becomes a part of the whole by sub-
ordinating himself to it, becoming like it’
(Tiffany 1923, 644-45).
51Epictetus 1995, 290.
52Marcus Aurelius 2011, 98. For the ar-
gument that it is ‘disinterested love rather
than disinterested pleasure’ that charac-
terises aesthetic experience for Shaftes-
bury, see Glauser 2002, 50.
53Shaftesbury 1900, 6.
54Taylor, who sees Shaftesbury as fore-
most a Stoic, says this well: ‘The high-
est good for humans is to love and take
joy in the whole course of the world’ (Tay-
lor 1989, 251). It should be noted that
Stolnitz himself recognises this aspect of
Shaftesbury’s thought. As he rather de-
jectedly observes, Shaftesbury’s ‘philoso-
phy is essentially a celebration of the sur-
passing goodness of the world-order’ (Stol-
nitz 1961b, 104).
55Scholars have long recognised this
seeming paradox in Shaftesburian ‘dis-
interestedness’. ‘Rather than opposing
interested and disinterested judgment’,
Townsend explains, ‘Shaftesbury uses dis-
interested judgments as evidence that we
have a true interest to be discovered be-
neath the shifting ground of pleasure and
fancy’ (Townsend 1987, 299). Guyer
points out that though our pleasure in
beauty may be ‘independent of any self-
interested desire for personal use and pos-
session’, this does not mean that it is ‘not
connected to other human interests at all.
On the contrary, in Shaftesbury’s view,
our pleasure in beauty is directly con-
nected with our deepest intellectual and
moral interests’ (Guyer 2018, 37). Ac-
cording to Axelsson, Flodin, and Pirholt,
Shaftesbury connects ‘disinterestedness to
a higher (non-selfish) interest: namely, the
moral interest in a reconciliation with na-
ture’ (Axelsson, Flodin, and Pirholt 2021,
6). The Stoic discourse of world contem-
plation provides a detailed account of why
this is the case.
56Rilke 2009, 55.
57Shaftesbury appears to be drawing on
Marcus’ claim that nature ‘transforms into
herself everything within her that seems to
be decaying and growing old and useless,
and out of these very things creates other
new things in their place’ (Marcus Aure-
lius 2011, 79).
58For a more extreme position, see Ar-
regui and Arnau 1994.
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